The international origins of Hannah Arendt’s historical method by Owens, Patricia
 1 




University of Sussex 
Abstract. This article examines the multiple ways in which Hannah Arendt’s thought 
arose historically and in international context, but also how we might think about history 
and theory in new ways with Arendt. It is commonplace to situate Arendt’s political and 
historical thought as a response to totalitarianism. However, far less attention has been 
paid to the significance of other specifically and irreducibly international experiences and 
events. Virtually all of her singular contributions to political and international thought 
were influenced by her lived experiences of and historical reflections on statelessness and 
exile, imperialism, transnational totalitarianism, world wars, the nuclear revolution, the 
founding of Israel, war crimes trials, and the war in Vietnam. Yet we currently lack a 
comprehensive reconstruction of the extent to which Arendt’s thought was shaped by the 
fact of political multiplicity, that there are not one but many polities existing on earth and 
inhabiting the world. This neglect is surprising in light of the significant ‘international 
turn’ in the history of thought and intellectual history; the growing interest in Arendt’s 
thought within international theory; and, above all, Arendt’s own unwavering 
commitment to plurality not simply as a characteristic of individuals but as an essential 
and intrinsically valuable effect of distinct territorial entities. The article examines the 
historical and international context of Arendt’s historical method, including her critique 
of process- and development-oriented histories that remain current in different social 
science fields, setting out and evaluating her alternative approach to historical writing. 
  
[T]his system of relationships established by action, in which the past lives on in the form 
of a history that goes on speaking and being spoken about, can only exist within the 
world produced by man, nesting there in the stones until they too speak and in speaking 
bear witness, even if we must first dig them out of the earth. 
 - Hannah Arendt, 2005 [1955]: 161-162 
 
Few twentieth century political thinkers exemplify more than German-American Jewish 
political theorist Hannah Arendt the extent to which international encounters 
are productive of theorizing and how theory arises historically. Virtually all of Arendt’s 
singular and enduring contributions to political and international thought were constituted 
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in and through her lived experiences of and historical reflections on statelessness and 
exile, imperialism, transnational totalitarianism, world wars, the founding of Israel, war 
crimes trials, and the war in Vietnam. She insisted that political thought be grounded in 
historical knowledge. Otherwise, as she told students in 1955, ‘we don’t know what we 
do and what we are talking about’ (1955: 5). To be sure, Arendt most often described 
herself as a political theorist and she should not be read as a conventional historian of 
imperialism, totalitarianism, and revolution, though she wrote significant books on these 
subjects. Yet Arendt approached even the most philosophical of questions historically. 
Some of her earliest scholarly writing engaged with philosophies of history; she 
consistently sought to establish the historical grounds for her political theory; and she 
actively embraced and sought to theorize the role of historical experience on political and 
historical thought. She argued that thought and historical writing is not only bound to 
time, but also the character of the times governs the possibility of thinking the 
relationship of the past to the present in a fully historical and political manner. These 
seemingly simple avowals have profound implications for the task of considering the 
relation between history and theory, especially historical-theoretical sensibility and 
method. Given the enormity of Arendt’s contributions to twentieth century political 
thought, it is thus surprising that only recently have political theorists and historians of 
thought begun to place her historical writings at the centre of her work (Honohan, 1990; 
Owens, 2007; King and Stone, 2007; Hoffmann, 2010; Novák, 2010; Kang, 2013; 
Yaqoob, 2014a; Keedus, 2015).  
It is commonplace to situate Hannah Arendt’s political and historical thought as a 
response to totalitarianism (Young-Bruehl, 2004 [1982]; Canovan, 1992, Villa, 1999; 
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Benhabib, 2000) and war (Owens, 2007). However, far less attention has been paid to the 
influence of other specifically and irreducibly international experiences and events on 
Arendt’s life and work and, more specifically, her approach to historical epistemology. 
We currently lack a comprehensive reconstruction of the extent to which the context and 
content of Arendt’s thought was shaped by the fact of political multiplicity, that there are 
not one but many polities existing on earth and inhabiting the world, to adapt Arendt’s 
understanding of plurality (1958: 7). This neglect is also surprising in light of the 
significant ‘international turn’ in the history of thought and intellectual history (Sluga, 
2015); the growing interest in Arendt’s thought within international theory (Lang and 
Williams, 2005; Owens, 2007; Hayden, 2009); and, above all, Arendt’s own unwavering 
commitment to political plurality not simply as a characteristic of individuals but as an 
essential and intrinsically valuable result of distinct territorial entities. As Arendt wrote in 
the 1961 preface to Between Past and Future, ‘thought itself arises out of incidents of 
living experience and must remain bound to them as the only guideposts by which to take 
its bearings’ (1968a: 14). Given the considerable extent to which international encounters 
form the incidents of lived experience then serious thinking about Arendt’s thought, and 
of course the international itself, must remain bound to them. Of course, ‘thought itself is 
historic’ (Arendt, 1994b [1954]: 431). But this history is not fully understood if we 
neglect its international conditions. Hence we need a fuller examination of the 
international origins of Arendt’s historical method.  
The first part of this essay places Arendt’s earliest political activism and 
intellectual development in the context of Jewish statelessness in 1930s Europe. Arendt 
was involved in practical action and intellectual debates on the course of the Second 
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World War, the British Mandate in Palestine, the political organization of Jewish people, 
and the post-war reconstruction of Europe and its empires. These political and intellectual 
commitments shaped the content and structure of Arendt’s most historical work, her 
monumental study The Origins of Totalitarianism (1966 [1951]). Arendt’s decisive 
influence on the historiography of the period was her insistence that the roots of 
European fascism were not German, or even European. They were fundamentally 
imperial and international. Crucially, totalitarian domination represented a rupture in the 
continuity of historical time, incomprehensible to conventional historical and sociological 
approaches predicated upon this continuity. Accordingly, the second part analyses the 
highly unconventional historical approach that Arendt adopted in Origins, first published 
in 1951. Later, in an effort to develop a political response to the absolute novelty of the 
death factories, and by now a citizen of Cold War America, Arendt reflected on the 
character of historical thought in the more immediate context of another new reality that 
encompassed the whole of humanity and could destroy all life on earth. Hence the third 
part examines Arendt’s still prescient critique of process- and development-oriented 
understandings of history in response to the invention of the atomic bomb. The final part 
examines Arendt’s post-totalitarian alternatives to the grand sweeping historical 
sociological generalizations about global ‘processes’ and historical development still so 
current across several social science fields. This historical counterpart to Arendt’s novel 
theory of politics centred on identifying the basic phenomenological conditions of 
historical experience since the possibility of politics itself, she argued, is bound to 
individual and collective experiences of time; understanding the fragmentary and 
discontinuous character of the remembered past; seeking to grasp phenomena and events 
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in their singularity and particularity; and identifying the new and unexpected, including 
through the exemplary lives of historical persons. Hannah Arendt points us toward a 
method for international history that is grounded in ‘lived incidents’ as guideposts for 
thinking, while accepting the fragmentary character of understanding given its rootedness 
in the plurality not only of persons but also polities.  
 
I. ‘Thought itself is historic’ 
 
Hannah Arendt’s position as a secular middle-class Jewess in interwar Germany - an 
international position ‘from the very beginning’ as modern anti-Semitism ‘functioned as 
an International’ (1994c [1945]: 141) - profoundly influenced her earliest political 
activity and writing. In 1929, before she became active against Nazism, Arendt began 
researching a biography of the writer and influential salon hostess, Rahel Varnhagen 
(1771-1833), based on Varnhagen’s papers collected at the Manuscript Division of the 
Prussian State Library. This was before the Gestapo arrested Arendt in 1933 and 
imprisoned her for also researching anti-Semitic propaganda. Rahel Varnhagen, first 
published almost three decades later, is not a straightforward historical biography, but an 
experimental attempt to ‘narrate the story of Rahel’s life as she herself might have told it’ 
(Arendt, 1974 [1957]: xv). The narrative centres on Varnhagen’s initial striving for 
acceptance in German gentile society through marriage, Christian conversion, and 
Enlightenment emancipation, but ultimately her eventual acceptance of her Jewish and 
pariah status. Except in its unconventionality and concern with the ‘Jewish Question’, 
this ‘life of a Jewish woman’ does not sit easily within the rest of Arendt’s oeuvre. And 
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yet, as others have suggested, to a great extent, the biography becomes semi-
autobiography, as well as a prescient historical and political analysis of the seeds of the 
coming catastrophe faced by millions of European Jews (Young-Bruehl, 1982/2004).  
Arendt was more politically active as a stateless and rightless Jew between 1933 
and 1951 than at any other period of her life: arrested and imprisoned in Germany; 
escaping without papers to Geneva where she briefly worked as an administrator at the 
League of Nations; then to France where she worked to send children to Palestine; 
interred by the Vichy regime at the camp in Gurs; escaping before many of its inmates 
were sent to Auschwitz; and arriving in the United States (Young-Bruehl, 1982/2004: 
106-7). The central purpose of Arendt’s writing in these decisive years was to historicize 
anti-Semitism and politicize Jews. Assimilation had failed, but so too would any Zionist 
embrace of pseudo-biological essences, the notion of Jewish identity as emanating from 
‘an eternal organic body, the product of inevitable natural growth of inherent qualities’ or 
any notion of an eternal anti-Semitism (2007a [1944], 367). To the extent that Jewish 
identity was to be political it had to be understood as worldly and historical. Yet, if 
attacked as Jews, Arendt insisted, they ought to embrace political and military resistance 
as Jews: ‘you cannot say, “Excuse me, I am not a Jew; I am a human being”. That is 
silly’, she wrote. To defend oneself as anything else would have been ‘nothing but a 
grotesque and dangerous evasion of reality’ (Arendt, 1968b: 18). Arendt’s intense 
support for the creation of a Jewish army, especially through 1942, went beyond chipping 
in to the military effort. She envisioned the organization and mobilization of units of 
armed Jewish men and women as a founding act of Jewish political organization. But, 
contra Clausewitz and the tradition of political realism, this participation in reciprocal 
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violence was not to be understood as the quintessence of politics itself, though exemplary 
political action could occur in wartime (Arendt, 1970a; Owens, 2007).  
It is abundantly clear that several of Hannah Arendt’s major contributions to 
political theory were shaped by her active involvement in the struggle over the new order 
in Palestine. One of the earliest and still most influential ‘post-Zionists’, she offered 
concrete proposals to undermine the establishment of a mono-ethnic/religious Jewish 
state to prevent Palestinians suffering a similar fate as European Jews. Exclusive national 
sovereignty in the State of Israel could only be a kind of Jewish pseudo-sovereignty 
(2007b [1948]: 401). ‘A home that my neighbor does not recognize and respect is not a 
home… but an illusion - until it becomes a battlefield’ (Arendt, 2007c [1945]: 235). 
Eventually, Arendt came to endorse a bi-national state since the vast majority of Arabs 
and Jews rejected multiethnic/religious federation. The influence of socialist Zionism on 
Arendt’s writings on Israel/Palestine, and much of her mature political thought, is clear 
(Ashcroft, 2015). It has also been noted that ‘Arendt’s strategies of historical 
representation shared profound affinities with the urgent and engaged historical thinking 
of her German-Jewish contemporaries’, including Walter Benjamin (Curthoys, 2010: 
107). Less well known is how Arendt’s signature contribution to international 
historiography in The Origins of Totalitarianism was shaped by her involvement in pan-
European debates on the future of postwar world order among wartime resistance 
movements.  
Hannah Arendt vehemently opposed ‘German’ readings of totalitarianism, as the 
result of some deeply rooted authoritarianism within its history or character. First, she 
insisted that, to a great extent, Nazism arose ‘from the vacuum resulting from an almost 
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simultaneous breakdown of Europe’s social and political structures… The truth was that 
the class structure of European society could no longer function; it simply could no 
longer work either in its feudal form in the East or in its bourgeois form in the West’ 
(1994 [1945]: 111, emphasis added). Second, the germ of fascism was international, not 
just European: its ‘roots are strong and they are called - Anti-Semitism, Racism, 
Imperialism’ (1994d [1945] 150). To center totalitarianism within German, or even 
European history, was not simply historically dubious. It legitimized the return to 
national sovereign states after German fascism was overcome. To prevent the 
reemergence of a new fascist international it was not enough to limit German sovereignty. 
Those elements of totalitarianism ‘do not cease to exist’, she wrote, ‘with the defeat of 
one or all totalitarian governments’ (1994a [1954]: 324). Citing what she claimed was the 
dominant view among the underground resisters - as distinct from the governments-in-
exile - Arendt argued that European and eventually worldwide federation was the only 
real antidote to the ‘walking corpse’ of the sovereign state (1994c [1945]: 143). Hannah 
Arendt’s political conviction regarding the necessity of federally organized 
commonwealths, rooted in international encounters and personal experiences, contributed 
directly to the central historical argument of her path-breaking transnational history of 
totalitarianism. As Selinger has recently made clear, Arendt saw ‘the historiography of 
Nazism as profoundly connected with the future reconstruction of Europe’ (2016: 2).    
The Origins of Totalitarianism (1966 [1951]) is ‘one of the constitutive books of 
postcolonial studies’, prefiguring claims by leading scholars of race and empire about the 
colonial origins of European fascism (DuBois, 2015 [1947]: 23; Grosse, 2006: 36). 
Central to this status is a series of historical distinctions Hannah Arendt drew between 
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Jew-hatred and anti-Semitism; race thinking and racism; and settler colonialism and the 
‘new imperialism’ of the late-nineteenth-century. ‘In historical inquiries’, she wrote, ‘it is 
not important to arrive at ready-made definitions, but constantly to make distinctions, and 
these distinctions must follow the language we speak and the subject matter we deal with’ 
(1994h [1953]: 385). Ordinary Jew-hatred became radicalized and ideological as the 
institutions and economies of European states collapsed. Race thinking, which had 
always accompanied European expansion, was transformed into racism when race was 
propagated as ‘the new key to history’ (1966 [1951], 170). The governments established 
under settler colonialism and traditional empire building had no counterpart in the age of 
the ‘new imperialism’. Instead, the amalgamation of bureaucracy and racism served as a 
replacement for government, rationalizing the massacre and administration (or both - 
‘administrative massacres’) of subject peoples. Arendt’s formative role in postcolonial 
scholarship is grounded on her claim that this substitution of a racial for political order 
was normalized and transported back to Europe. ‘African colonial possessions’, she 
wrote, ‘became the most fertile soil for the flowering of what later was to become the 
Nazi elite. Here they had seen with their own eyes how peoples could be converted into 
races and how… one might put one’s own people into the position of the master race’ 
(1966 [1951], 206). From ‘the wild murdering’ of Carl Peters in German Southeast 
Africa, to the ideology of ‘expansion for expansion’s sake’, ‘the stage seemed to be set’, 
she wrote, ‘for all possible horrors. Lying right under anybody’s nose were many of the 
elements which gathered together could create a totalitarian government on the basis of 
racism’ (1966 [1951], 221, 185).  
Hannah Arendt’s version of the boomerang thesis, the unintended consequences 
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of imperial blowback, has been central to all subsequent historical studies of the links 
between Imperial Germany’s conduct in Africa and Nazi conduct on the Eastern front 
(Arendt, 1966 [1951], xvii, 155, 206, 223; Hull, 2005; Zimmerer, 2004). However, in 
Arendt’s own analysis, British, French and even German imperial practices played an 
indirect role in Europe’s further descent into twentieth-century total war. In Origins, the 
most significant precursor to totalitarianism was not overseas imperialism, but the 
continental imperialisms of the pan-German and pan-Slav Leagues. These imperialist 
pan-movements were the real templates for totalitarian rule with their disdain for 
constitutional politics and existing institutions: mobs replaced classes and the party 
system, organized around the basis of class interests, was overwhelmed. The immediate 
predecessor of totalitarianism was continental imperialism. And yet several of the 
ideological rationalisations and forms of thought that accompanied overseas imperialism 
- obedience to the laws of nature or history, the role of impersonal and world historical 
‘processes’ and necessities - were fundamental to totalitarianism.  
The profound originality and relevance of Hannah Arendt’s work in this context is 
not simply her decentered, international and transnational history of what she took to be 
the central phenomenon of the twentieth-century, nor is it that Origins was shaped by 
Arendt’s international experiences and wartime political commitments, significant though 
they are. The political, historiographical and philosophical stakes are even higher. For 
while the discussion thus far has centered on Arendt’s formative role as the ‘godmother’ 
of the boomerang thesis (Kühne, 2013: 341), more significant is her insistence on the 
unprecedented character of totalitarianism. Hannah Arendt is best read not simply as an 
historian of the imperial roots of totalitarianism, but also for how and why she violated 
 11 
and reworked conventional historical narrative of cause and effect, that is, as a theorist of 
history. For Arendt, totalitarianism marked a fundamental rupture in the presumed 
continuity of history with enormous implications for the experience of historical time and 
the practice of historical writing. The event of totalitarian domination, she wrote, ‘marks 
the division between the modern age - rising with the natural sciences in the seventeenth-
century, reaching its political climax in the revolutions of the eighteenth, and unfolding 
its general implications after the Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth - and the world 
of the twentieth century, which came into existence through the chain of catastrophes 
touched off by the First World War’ (1968c: 26-27). This is not any vulgar notion of one 
century being somehow more important than another. Rather, as we now discuss, what 
led up to and happened in the Nazi death factories radically transformed the continuity of 
historical time and with it the conditions of historical thought. ‘We can no longer afford 
to take that which was good in the past and simply call it our heritage, to discard the bad 
and simply think of it as a dead load which by itself time will bury in oblivion. The 
subterranean stream of Western history has finally come to the surface’ (Arendt, 1966 
[1951], ix). 
 
II. ‘Analysis in Terms of History’ 
 
It is cliché to observe that Hannah Arendt’s writing does not correspond to any traditional 
school of thought or academic field. The distance between her work and conventional 
approaches to political science and historical method is well known (Vollrath, 1977; 
Luban, 1983). ‘One of the difficulties of the book’, Arendt later wrote about Origins, ‘is 
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that it does not belong to any school and hardly uses any of the officially recognized or 
officially controversial instruments’ (1994e [1953]: 402). She not only ‘saw herself at 
odds with the entire disciplinary matrix of her epoch’ (Baehr, 2002: 804); she actively 
broke many of the rules of historical and political science. As Seyla Benhabib has 
observed, Origins ‘is too systematically ambitious and overinterpreted to be a strictly 
historical account; it is too anecdotal, narrative, and ideographic to be considered social 
science, and although it has the vivacity and stylistic flair of a work of political 
journalism, it is too philosophical to be accessible to a broad public’ (2000: 63). But this 
is not just a question of an iconoclast shunning orthodoxy. Arendt believed that 
conventional historical narrative and social science could not adequately comprehend the 
industrial production of corpses. The Nazi ‘extermination camps… must cause social 
scientists and historical scholars to reconsider their hitherto unquestioned fundamental 
preconceptions regarding the course of the world and human behavior’ (1994f [1950], 
232). In turning away from conventional method, Arendt was illuminating and 
diagnosing the historical-philosophical significance of a phenomenon - the Nazi 
extermination camps - that made orthodox approaches seem obsolete. These ‘laboratories 
in the experiment of total domination’ (1994f [1950], 240) overturned the then dominant 
social science views about the motives for human conduct and what it means to think 
about continuity in historical time. 
 The contention authorizing Hannah Arendt’s sweeping conclusion was her claim 
that totalitarian domination was qualitatively different from all the tyrannies and 
dictatorships that had come before. In her words, 
It is far from unprecedented to wage an aggressive war; massacres of enemy 
population or even of what one assumes to be hostile people look like an everyday 
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affair in the bloody record of history; extermination of natives in the process of 
colonization and the establishment of new settlements has happened in America, 
Australia, and Africa; slavery is one of the oldest institutions of mankind and 
forced-labor gangs, employed by the state for the performance of public works, 
were one of the mainstays of the Roman Empire. Even the claim to world rule, 
well known from the history of political dreams, is no monopoly of totalitarian 
governments. All these aspects of totalitarian rule, hideous and criminal as they 
are, have one thing in common which separates them from the phenomenon with 
which we are dealing: in distinction from the concentration camps, they have a 
definite purpose and they benefit the rulers… The motives are clear and the 
means to achieve the goal are utilitarian in the accepted sense of the term 
(1994/1950: 233-234). 
 
It was the anti-utilitarian character of the Nazi extermination camps - the central 
institutions of totalitarianism - that fundamentally set them apart from the concentration 
and labour camps of imperial rule and ‘explode this whole framework of reference’ 
(Arendt, 1994f [1950], 234). Even from the Nazis’ own perspective, the vast majority of 
camp inmates were completely innocent and unthreatening to the regime. The SS men in 
charge ‘were completely normal’, Arendt claimed; none of those overseeing a system of 
permanent torture were especially ‘sadistic or cruel’ (1994f [1950], 239). Above all, the 
German state’s war effort was never allowed to interfere with efficient camp 
administration. The Nazi ‘gas chambers did not benefit anybody’ (1994f [1950], 236). 
Yet they trumped military exigency even in the context of total war and in the face of 
absolute defeat. For Arendt, these facts demonstrated the incommensurability between 
the concentration camps of imperial rule and the Nazi death chambers. The latter did not 
‘merely’ exterminate and degrade particular humans for instrumental ends, though this 
did indeed occur; they sought to transform human beings as such into mere things (1966 
[1951], 438). The differences between totalitarian domination and what had come before 
were so great as to destroy the standards and categories of existing social and historical 
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thought. 
To Arendt, conventional historical narrative relied on historical analogies and 
causal sequence, thus portraying totalitarianism as the culmination of long-term 
developmental historical processes. Similarly, the social science of her day largely relied 
on simplistic ideal-types, utilitarian motives, and/or functionalism. The ‘modern 
historical and social sciences’, she thus claimed, were beset by a ‘kind of confusion - 
where everything distinct disappears and everything that is new and shocking is (not 
explained but) explained away either through drawing some analogies or reducing it to a 
previously known chain of causes and influences’ (1994e [1953], 407). For example, she 
criticized leading sociologists, such as Jules Monnerot, for reducing totalitarian ideology 
to a form of political or secular religion (Arendt, 1994h [1953]). Such forms of 
conventional historical and social science could adequately comprehend the absolute 
novelty of totalitarianism. They could not fathom the unprecedented nature of the camps, 
specifically the attempt to make humans superfluous as human beings, the absolute terror 
of never-ending experiments in total domination. Arendt located the problem in the 
hegemony of process-thinking and developmental histories, both of which she argued 
defined the modern concept of history itself. Before analyzing Arendt’s critique of these 
modes of thought ‘virtually unknown prior to the modern age’ (1958: 116) first consider 
the alternative historical method she adopted in Origins. Why spend sixty percent of the 
book addressing the historical phenomena of racism, anti-Semitism and imperialism if 
totalitarianism was not the product of or continuous with them? What purpose did that 
serve? If totalitarianism was not something that could be understood through the setting 
out a chain of causes in which totalitarianism was the logical outcome, then how should 
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its history be written?  
Part of the difficulty of interpretation is that The Origins of Totalitarianism, a title 
chosen by its American publisher, is not a study of ‘origins’ in this sense, of analyzing 
racism, anti-Semitism and imperialism as causal factors in totalitarianism. 1  Anti-
Semitism, Arendt explained, could only be said to have ‘prepared the ground’; it was not 
the first or earliest manifestation of totalitarian solutions to the Jewish Question somehow 
already present, for example, at the Dreyfus Affair (1994f [1950], 235; 1966 [1951], 
ch.4). This is not possible, she wrote, ‘because this essence…[of totalitarianism] did not 
exist before it had come into being’ (1994e [1953], 405). Instead racism, anti-Semitism 
and imperialism were examined as the main ‘elements’ that ‘crystallized’ in a particular 
historical moment to become the phenomenon of totalitarianism itself. ‘I therefore talk 
only of “elements”’, Arendt belatedly explained, ‘which eventually crystallized into 
totalitarianism, some of which are traceable to the eighteenth-century, some perhaps even 
further back… Under no circumstances would I call any of them totalitarian’ (1994e 
[1953], 405-406). Only once racism, imperialism, and anti-Semitism crystallized was it 
possible, in retrospect, to see them as origins of something - totalitarianism - that  
‘illuminates its own past’ (Arendt, 1994a [1954], 319). Thus, Arendt analysed these 
phenomena ‘in historical terms, tracing these elements back in history as far as I deemed 
proper and necessary. That is, I did not write a history of totalitarianism but an analysis in 
terms of history’ (1994e [1953], 403). To illustrate, Book II of Origins - with chapters 
titled ‘The Political Emancipation of the Bourgeoisie’, ‘Race Thinking Before Racism’, 
‘Race and Bureaucracy’, ‘Continental Imperialism: the Pan-Movements’, and ‘The 
                                                     
1 The original title first published in Britain by Secker and Warburg in 1951 was The Burden of Our Time. The front 
cover announces the book as, ‘An historical study of the world-wide crisis of our time, with its evil concept - the 
deliberate dehumanization of humanity’.  
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Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man’ - is clearly not a history of 
imperialism per se. Rather it examined the ‘element of expansion insofar as [it was] 
clearly visible and played a decisive role in the totalitarian phenomenon itself’ (1994e 
[1953], 403).  
In light of its phenomenally verifiable content, its historical essence, Hannah 
Arendt claimed totalitarianism was not an event that could be assimilated into the 
movement of historical processes, as suggested by conventional historical and social 
science (c.f. Aron, 1969 [1965]). Her retrospective narrative involved analyzing those 
aspects of the complex history of imperialism, racism, and anti-Semitism that combined 
to become something unprecedented, suggesting their altogether different historical 
significance from what could have appeared at the time of their emergence. She sought to 
show how totalitarianism could not be deduced from or caused by its main ‘elements’; 
was in no sense the logical outcome of what came before; and was not the inevitable 
product of modernity, as if foreordained in the teleological progression of Western 
history (c.f. Adorno and Horkheimer (1979 [1944]). This is what Arendt meant when she 
called totalitarianism ‘an almost complete break in the continuous flow of Western 
history’ (1966 [1951], 124). Thus for historical, philosophical, and political reasons, 
Arendt was deeply reluctant to conceive the central event of the twentieth-century as an 
exemplary instance of some longer-term developmental processes or the manifestation of 
underlying social structures, which is the default position for process-thinking and 
developmental histories. As historian Richard H. King has pointed out, the use of the 
language of ‘crystallization’ to encapsulate the historical coming together of the elements 
of totalitarianism ‘was shrewdly chosen, since the process of crystallization can hardly be 
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perceived as taking place over time, as opposed to happening, in the shortest historical 
duration, within a moment of time’ (2007: 253). The language and underlying method 
that Hannah Arendt developed through the 1940s was her alternative to a chronological 
historical narrative or process- and development-oriented understandings of 
totalitarianism. In other words, Arendt’s critique and the alternative she would develop in 
later writing was first and foremost grounded in her own historical and international 
experiences with and politically charged reflections on totalitarianism. 
 
III. ‘The key words of modern historiography’ 
 
By the 1950s, and now a citizen of the United States, Hannah Arendt believed that the 
invention of the atomic bomb had joined totalitarianism as the two most ‘fundamental 
experiences of our age’ (2005: 109; King, 2015). Now moving from the scene of total 
war in Europe to Cold War America, Arendt’s reflections on historical method were still 
shaped by distinctly international, and now increasingly global, affairs. ‘The horror that 
swept over mankind when it learned about the first atomic bomb’, she wrote, ‘was the 
horror of an energy that came from the universe and is supernatural in the truest sense of 
the word’ (2005: 158). Any new political reality of ‘mankind’ after the Holocaust was 
thus not the product of the ‘dreams of the humanists’, the dangerous fantasy of a world 
state that was more likely to bring forth a murderous tyranny than world peace (1968h: 
81). It was occasioned by two facts that emerged from the recent experience of global 
war, the revolution in communications and the existence of the atom bomb (1968h: 87). 
These technological developments, but especially the nuclear revolution, were at the root 
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of any meaningful existence of ‘mankind’ and, for Arendt, were the influential backdrop 
for what she saw as an urgent attempt to theorize history and politics anew for a post-
totalitarian but now nuclear age.  
Based on her readings in the history of science, including works by Copernicus 
and Galileo, Arendt claimed that the rise of modern science and its commitment to 
uncovering the laws of scientific and natural processes had a profound effect on 
philosophies of history (1968d, 57; Yaqoob, 2014b). The crucial correspondence between 
natural science and the ‘modern concept of history’ that emerged with the early modern 
scientific revolution was their duel emphasis on development and processes. In Arendt’s 
words, 
Historically, political theorists from the seventeenth century onward were 
confronted with a hitherto unheard-of process of growing wealth, growing 
property, growing acquisition. In the attempt to account for this steady growth, 
their attention was naturally drawn to the phenomenon of a progressing process 
itself… From its beginning, this process… was understood as a natural process… 
in the image of the life process itself (Arendt, 1958: 105; also Hyvönen, 2016) 
 
Historical imaginaries dominated by processes not only appeared to be in accord with the 
laws of science, and the evolution of human life itself, but also compatible with new 
methods of administering life and prosecuting wars. Capitalist expansion seemed to 
mirror the natural processes of life in ‘ever-recurring cycles’ (Arendt, 1958: 134; Owens, 
2015: Ch.3). With the testing of hydrogen bombs and the spread of thermonuclear 
weapons it was as though ‘automatic processes’ leading to a nuclear holocaust would 
‘proceed unchecked’ (2005: 107). The ‘chain reaction of the atom bomb…’ Arendt wrote, 
‘can easily become the symbol for a conspiracy between man and the elementary forces 
of nature, which… may one day take their revenge and destroy all life on the surface of 
the earth’ (1994 [1954]: 419). On the face of it, capitalism, imperialism, totalitarianism, 
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and nuclear competition all seemed to demonstrate the fundamentally process-character 
of human history. In the modern age, it appeared only a short step for humans to consider 
themselves ‘part and parcel of the two superhuman, all-encompassing processes of nature 
and history’ (1958: 307). 
Arendt illustrated the flaws of process-oriented historical explanation with 
Hegelian and Marxist philosophies of history, in which the appearance of events and 
phenomena primarily served to illustrate a deeper, though hidden, structural cause, 
development process or law. In Arendt’s words, 
Since Hegel watched Napoleon ride into Jena and saw in him not the emperor of 
France nor the conqueror of Prussia, not the son and not the destroyer or 
overcomer of the French Revolution, that is, nothing that Napoleon actually was 
at this moment, but rather ‘world spirit on horseback’ - since that time historians 
and historiography have believed that they are finished with the investigation and 
depiction of an event only when they have discovered that which is functionally 
exponential in it, namely that which itself is hidden imperceptibly behind the 
visible and the experiential (Arendt quoted in Hoffmann, 2010: 226). 
 
With the arresting image of Napoleon as ‘world spirit on horseback’, time was conceived 
as a constant flow; historical events and specific individuals were largely meaningful to 
the extent that they reflected a deeper direction, ultimate end and reason in history. 
Though Marx more promisingly sought to ground world historical processes in the 
actions of the laboring classes he too subsumed the past into a grand teleological 
narrative of large-scale developmental processes of production. Arendt’s critique of 
historical materialism did not extend to Marxist analyses of capitalism or imperialism. 
Probably influenced by her husband Heinrich Blücher, a member of Rosa Luxembourg’s 
Spartacus League, Arendt’s analysis of imperial motives centred on outlets for surplus 
capital and the bourgeois search for profits. Further, in 1949, she complained to her 
 20 
mentor Karl Jaspers that in Cold War America ‘every little idiot thinks he has the right 
and duty to look down on Marx now’ (Arendt to Jaspers, 1992: 137). The problem was 
that as a grand philosophy of history, Marxism retained a teleological commitment to the 
direction of history, to historical laws of movement and nature. Real historical persons, 
phenomena, and events ‘become almost accidental by-products’ or functions of historical 
processes (Arendt, 1968d: 57). 
Hannah Arendt did not deny the existence of structures or processes. Rather, she 
argued, that historical events were not the mere exterior manifestation of seemingly more 
fundamental forces. Particular events and specific persons possess an intelligibility and 
significance on their own; they do not lack meaning outside the ‘context’ of the 
overarching process, whether natural or man-made, of which modern philosophies of 
history imagine them to be a part. As already suggested in Arendt’s analysis of 
totalitarianism, transforming a particular phenomenon into a mere example or indicator of 
deeper processes obscures the meaning and novelty of historical events. This may be 
legitimate for scientists examining the recurrence of natural processes. ‘Newness’, in 
contrast, ‘is the realm of the historian, who - unlike the natural scientist, who is 
concerned with ever-recurring happenings - deals with events which always occur only 
once’ (1994a [1954], 318). Not only did modern, process-oriented philosophies of history 
explain events away as the completion of natural processes or anonymous structures 
where ‘single events and deeds and sufferings have no more meaning here than hammer 
and nails have with respect to the finished table’ (Arendt, 1968d: 80). They attempted to 
overcome the essential frailty, unpredictability, and even futility of political action with 
the durability of something that is made (Arendt, 1958). This was to equate political 
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action with shaping the human condition toward a preconceived end as a carpenter shapes 
a piece of wood, that is, through violence. Arendt’s response to the essential frailty of 
human affairs was not to assimilate politics into the naturalness of life or the 
instrumentality and violence of fabrication, both of which defined modern philosophies 
of history and were so appealing to imperial and totalitarian movements. Rather it was to 
retrieve a form of historical writing that coincided precisely with the frailty, but also new 
beginnings, inherent in political action. 
 
IV. History for a ‘Being whose Essence is Beginning’ 
 
Once again irreducibly international experiences influenced Arendt’s alternative 
approach to historical-political work. Walter Benjamin’s influential essay ‘Theses on the 
Philosophy of History’, written in early 1940, was among the manuscripts Benjamin 
entrusted to Arendt and her husband the last time they saw each other before seeking to 
escape to the United States, from France via Spain and Portugal. Soon after Benjamin 
took his own life on being told by Spanish authorities that he would be transported back 
to Vichy France as the border to Portugal from where he wished to sail to the United 
States was closed. Arendt’s biographer recounts how Arendt, Blücher, and other refugees 
read aloud to each other some of Benjamin’s writings, which would later be celebrated as 
among the most significant in the philosophy of history (Young-Bruehl, 1982/2004: 162). 
Fragments of at least three of Benjamin’s ‘Theses’ would have immediately stood out to 
Arendt: ‘nothing that has ever happened should be regarded as lost for history… The true 
picture of the past flits by’, Benjamin says. ‘The past can be seized only as an image 
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which flashes up at the instant when it can be recognized and is never again seen.... To 
articulate the past historically does not mean to recognize it “the way it really was” 
(Ranke). It means to seize hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger’ 
(1969 [1940]: 254-255). Hannah Arendt’s understanding of fragmentary history as well 
as her refusal to conceive the past in terms of necessity and progress is deeply indebted to 
Benjamin. She would later edit and introduce to English-readers a volume of his work, 
titled Illuminations, including the ‘Theses’. We can interpret much of Arendt’s later post-
war writings as the distinctly political historical and theoretical rendering of Benjamin’s 
claims. 
One of the reasons for the widespread appeal of developmental philosophies of 
history, Arendt insisted, is that the tradition of Western political thought since Plato 
failed to properly understand its central object. ‘Each time the modern age had reason to 
hope for a new political philosophy’, Arendt observed, ‘it received a philosophy of 
history instead’ (1958: 298, n62). Any genuinely new political theory required a new 
philosophy of history, a phenomenology-based analysis of the ‘anthropological 
conditions of historical experience’ (Hoffmann, 2010: 227). We have already seen the 
influence of a particular form of phenomenology on Arendt’s historical writing on 
totalitarianism. Rejecting all forms of metaphysics, the history of ideas, or abstract 
analysis of concepts, Arendt’s mode of phenomenological analysis was centered on the 
inherent meaningfulness of the lived-experience of events, prioritizing the factual, inter-
subjective, and experiential character of political being-in-the-world.2 The interpretive 
                                                     
2 On the influence of Heidegger on Arendt, but also the significant distance between them, see Villa who brilliantly 
reads ‘Arendt as appropriating Heidegger in a highly agonistic manner; as twisting, displacing, and reinterpreting his 
thought in ways designed to illuminate a range of exceedingly un-Heideggerian issues… Indeed, no small part of 
Arendt’s originality resides in her ability to see the political implications of a body of work in a way that goes against 
the grain of authorial intent’ (1996: 13).   
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task was one of understanding phenomena and events in their particularity, ‘separating 
the phenomenally verifiable content of an event from its genesis’ and making distinctions, 
which is not the same as offering up ‘definitions’ (1994g [1948], 166). Arendt most 
clearly explicated this phenomenology in The Human Condition (1958) in which she 
distinguished between three basic human activities, labour, work, and action. It is worth 
pausing to note how Arendt’s famous distinctions are fundamentally temporal (Ricoeur, 
1990).  
The endless and repetitive activity of attending to biological life needs through 
labour, Arendt argued, was essentially futile. Though necessary for the survival of the 
species, the cycle of life on earth produces nothing of permanence. However, the human 
activity of work builds an artificial human-made world on the earth and is thus able to 
‘bestow a measure of permanence and durability upon the futility of mortal life and the 
fleeting character of human time’ (Arendt, 1958: 8). The built-environment - works of art, 
monuments, laws and institutions - form this more durable world. Finally, there is action, 
the ever-present human capacity to begin something new with plural others, creating a 
‘“web of human relationships’ in-between people (1958: 183). Though ‘spun of the most 
ephemeral stuff, of fleeting words and quickly forgotten deeds’ (2005: 161), action is 
able to disrupt the continuity of natural processes and undo human-made structures. Yet 
while action is defined by its frailty and evanescence, since it ‘goes on directly between 
men without the intermediary of things or matter…, in so far as it engages in founding 
and preserving political bodies, [action] creates the condition for remembrance, that is, 
for history’ (1958: 7, 8-9). What Arendt took to be the most political of all human 
activities, the capacity for action, is defined in terms of interrupting natural and historical 
 24 
processes, while also creating the possibility of political memory where ‘the past lives on 
in a form of history that goes on speaking and being spoken about’ (2005: 161). The 
temporal dimensions of the activities of labour, work, and action underpin individual and 
collective experiences of time; they are the human conditions of historical experience.  
Hence the first historical counterpart to Hannah Arendt’s political theory is the 
historian’s obligation to identify the new, to engage in a form of historical writing that 
illuminates precisely because it refuses to place everything that happens in some broader 
‘trend’ of which the event is a mere example. Thus the rejection of the modern concept of 
history is closely related to Arendt’s account of political beginning and the human 
capacity for the new. In a manner not dissimilar to Reinhardt Koselleck’s understanding 
of newness as defining of human history, Arendt turned philosophy’s obsession with 
death on its head to argue that humans ‘are not born in order to die but in order to begin’ 
(1958: 246; 1994a [1954], 321; Kang, 2013). A decade later she observed again that 
‘historical processes are created and constantly interrupted by human initiative, by the 
initium man is insofar as he is acting being’ (1968e: 170). This is why Arendt so often 
wrote about ‘historical persons’ (1958: 184) and engaged in a kind of historical ‘teaching 
by example’ (1968i: 247). This is evident not only in the eleven biographical essays 
collected in Men in Dark Times, which include Rosa Luxembourg, Walter Benjamin, and 
Karl Jaspers, but also exemplary figures such as Socrates, Robespierre, Rahel Varnhagen, 
T. E. Lawrence, Benjamin Disraeli, and of course Adolf Eichmann, the Nazi fugitive 
captured in Argentina by Israeli agents and put on trial in Jerusalem in 1961. Arendt 
attended the major international event of the trial and her reports for The New Yorker 
were republished as Eichmann in Jerusalem: a report on the Banality of Evil (1963). 
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Violating almost all conventions of Holocaust representation and tone, she recounted that 
Jewish Councils had cooperated with Nazis; criticized Israel for turning the event into a 
pedagogical occasion such that ‘history… stood at the center of the trial’ (1963: 19); 
presented Eichmann himself as a nobody, a laughable clown, not the extreme monster 
many had wanted him to be, that should still hang for his crimes; and intervened in 
debates on international criminal law, especially crimes against humanity.  
More generally, Arendt’s historiographical method of using the lives of real 
people to illuminate particular historical moments was rooted in her political commitment 
to retain human dignity and capacity for action, judgement, and thought in the face of 
arguments for historical and/or natural necessities and laws, as Eichmann had pleaded 
when seeking to justify his utter failure to think for himself. For Arendt, histories were 
started by real persons precisely because humans are a being whose ‘essence is beginning’ 
(1994a: 321). As she wrote in Men in Dark Times of people other than Eichmann, the 
illumination of the past ‘may well come less from theories and concepts than from the 
uncertain, flickering, and often weak light that some men and women, in their lives and 
their works, will kindle under all circumstances and shed over the time span that was 
given them on earth’ (1968g, ix). While Arendt was interested in the history of thought, 
and contributed enormously to it, she insisted that ideologies and intellectual 
developments were not central forces in history. ‘I proceed from facts and events instead 
of intellectual affinities and influence’ (1994e [1953], 405). We might also add that she 
proceeded from real persons. To account for these historical persons and their ideas is 
obviously not to suggest that individuals shape the direction of history as they wish; nor 
does she seek to rigidly separate the meaning of their actions and ideas from the present. 
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Events transcend the original intentions of historical actors; they could not have been 
expected and they could not have been made; ‘whenever something new occurs’, Arendt 
wrote, ‘it bursts into the context of predictable processes as something unexpected, 
unpredictable, and ultimately causally inexplicable’ (2005: 111-112). In relating the lives 
and actions of historical persons and stories of moments of political freedom - political 
revolutions, wartime resistance, anti-war activism, and civil disobedience - Arendt was 
breaking the hold of history as continuity, process and progress. She was also seeking to 
bring these persons and moments into the present to illuminate something about the 
contemporary world. Almost all of these stories and moments were essentially 
international or related to international affairs. Perhaps this makes sense of Arendt’s 
otherwise strange claim that ‘Only in foreign affairs, because the relationships between 
nations still harbor hostilities and sympathies which cannot be reduced to economic 
factors, seem to be left as a purely political domain’ (1968e: 155). 
Not processes but (international) events themselves become the proper subject 
matter of historical writing, and these events are no less significant, no less meaningful, 
when they are removed from the need to situate them in engulfing processes of historical 
movement or ‘development’: ‘each event in human history’, Arendt claimed, ‘reveals an 
unexpected landscape of human deeds, sufferings, and new possibilities which together 
transcend the sum total of all willed intentions and the significance of all origins. It is the 
task of the historian to detect this unexpected new with all its implications in any given 
period and to bring out the full power of its significance’ (1994a [1954], 320). Thus, after 
the rupture in historical time represented by totalitarian domination, Arendt sought to 
reclaim moments of human freedom, but also the singularity and fragmentary character 
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of the remembered past. Hence, to conceive grounding for politics after totalitarianism 
and in the face of the threat of nuclear annihilation, Red Scares, the conformism in mass 
society, and the dangers to republican government posed by the Vietnam War, it is no 
surprise that Arendt turned to the question of revolution. In the early 1960s, she was 
drawn to write On Revolution because revolutions ‘are the only political events which 
confront us directly and inevitably with the problem of beginning’ (1970b [1963]), 13). It 
is also unsurprising that the central purpose of the book, as she saw it, was not to provide 
the most accurate account of the origins and motives of the French and American 
Revolutions, far from it. Rather the book was a ‘political fable’, a celebration of the 
participatory council system and, through the 1960s, was often required reading among 
American Students for a Democratic Society and German Socialist Students League 
(Young-Bruehl, 1982/2004: 403-404). No matter that Arendt conceived the French and 
American cases as failed revolutions; her purpose was to theorize the capacity for new 
beginnings and political re-founding in her own time and in light of the historical and 
moral significance of totalitarianism and the challenges posed to revolution by both neo-
colonialism and the nuclear age.  
The need to preserve a relation to the past, to preserve the past itself, was 
fundamental to humanizing the post-totalitarian world, but this past was necessarily 
discontinuous. Hence, for Arendt, historical narrative becomes fragmentary history. 
‘What you then are left with’, she wrote in her last book, The Life of the Mind, ‘is still the 
past, but a fragmented past, which has lost its certainty of evaluation’ (1978 [LM, Vol.1], 
212). In previous writing Arendt had illuminated this approach through the conceptual 
metaphor of the pearl diver who ‘descends to the bottom of the sea, not to excavate the 
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bottom and bring it to light but to pry loose the rich and the strange, the pearls and the 
corals in the depths, and carry them to the surface’ (1968f; 205). ‘What guides this 
thinking’, she observed, quoting Shakespeare’s The Tempest, ‘is the conviction that 
although the living is subject to the ruin of time, the process of decay is at the same time 
a process of crystallization, that in the depths of the sea… some things “suffer a sea-
change” and survive in new crystallized forms and shapes that remain immune to the 
elements, as though they waited only for the pearl diver who one day will come down to 
them and bring them up into the world of the living’ (1968f: 205-6). The meaning, as 
distinct from the cause, of an historical event becomes clear once it has been related as 
part of a story, and this storytelling also shapes history. This emphasis on narrative 
history does not contradict Arendt’s critique of history as continuous and teleological. 
Rather to make the past comprehensible in his fashion can be to emphasize disjuncture 
and contingency. For Arendt, it was the poets and historians, not the social scientists, who 
were responsible for conveying actions deserving of remembrance, actions that become 
the subject of poetry and history such that they potentially become immortal, that is, 
inspire and live on in the public, political world. ‘No philosophy, no analysis, no 
aphorism, be it ever so profound, can compare in intensity and richness of meaning with 
a properly narrated story’ (1968b: 22). Hans J. Morgenthau went so far as to compare 
Arendt’s historical writing to the storytelling of Thucydides (Young-Bruehl, 2006: 34). In 
fact, Arendt had identified a form of writing in Thucydides, and also Homer and 
Herodotus, in which the meaning of political events is revealed in the reflections of the 
political actors and the opinion of the judging spectators, the historians.  
In posthumously published writings on the political consequences of possible 
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nuclear annihilation, Hannah Arendt turned to ‘the ur-example’ of annihilatory war, the 
legendary Trojan War recounted in Homer’s The Illiad (2005: 163). How might wars of 
annihilation be transformed into ‘political wars’, that is, come to an end through an 
‘alliance and a treaty… according to which yesterday’s enemies became tomorrow’s 
allies’ (2005: 176-178)? To consider this urgent question, relevant not only to nuclear 
confrontation but Israel/Palestine, Arendt told a story in which wars ‘did not end in yet 
another annihilation of the vanquished, but an alliance and a treaty… inventing a new 
outcome for war’s conflagration’ (2005: 176). The ancient Romans, who traced their 
origins to defeat in the Trojan War, were able to build an empire among the formerly 
vanquished, establishing new relationships with former foes. To be sure, the turn away 
from wars of annihilation was not for the sake of ethics, but ‘for the sake of expanding 
Rome’ (2005: 185-187). Pointing to Rome’s peace treaties and alliances was no naïve 
liberal internationalism, nor any attempt to historically ‘contextualise’ the conditions for 
averting annihilatory war. Arendt was clear that, for the vanquished, defeat ‘was 
synonymous with plunder, murder, and theft’ (2005: 189). Rather Arendt’s reading of 
Homer for the nuclear age was allegorical and in line with her better known writing on 
the ancient Greek polis, that is, as a monumental form of historical consciousness.3 This 
particular response to the dangers posed by nuclear annihilation was an exemplary 
exercise in pearl diving, of Benjamin’s call ‘to seize hold of a memory as it flashes up at 
a moment of danger’ (1969 [1940]: 255). Arendt was carrying to the surface a vision of a 
different kind of politics - and foreign policy - that was itself a ‘response to an experience 
of annihilation’ (Shell, 2010: 257).  
 
                                                     




Hannah Arendt is an historical figure of significance in her own right (Krieger, 1976), the 
subject of films, documentaries, plays, art exhibitions, and an endless stream of articles 
and books, almost all commenting on her originality and distance from conventional 
approaches to historical and social science. This article has examined the neglected 
international origins and context of Arendt’s work, specifically her approach to historical 
method, a method that crystallized through her political activism and experiences in the 
1930s through to her response to the horrors of a different (nuclear) war of annihilation in 
the 1950s and ‘60s. If Hannah Arendt is the ‘political theorist of the post-totalitarian 
moment’, then we cannot fully appreciate her influence and significance without 
understanding the deeply generative impact of the international on her thought (Benhabib, 
1999). Arendt insisted that the event of totalitarianism fundamentally transformed the 
conditions of historical and political thought and she directly confronted the 
consequences of its rupture in the continuity of historical time. Her response to 
totalitarianism, the danger of nuclear annihilation, and the precariousness of revolutions 
in a neo-colonial age was to innovate forms of historical writing that was compatible with, 
a counterpart to, human plurality and freedom, and the frailty of, but new beginning 
intrinsic to, political action. Indeed, the importance of international events and contexts 
on Arendt’s thought corresponds to, and may be partially responsible for, the enormous 
value she placed on plurality as one of the conditions of human existence. This concept is 
not limited to Arendt’s better-known and celebrated writing on the plurality of persons as 
the basic condition of politics; that ‘we are all the same, that is, human, in such a way that 
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nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live’ (1958: 8). 
Arendt’s relational and plural understanding of the individual subject is also found in her 
writing on the value of international plurality as the equal plurality of distinct peoples.  
To inhabit the world, Hannah Arendt insisted, is also necessarily a form of 
cohabitation. The fact that there are multiple and plural territorially defined human-made 
(not naturally-defined) entities on the earth gives meaning to the inter-national, from the 
Latin ‘between’ and ‘among’, as that which ‘relates and separates… at the same time’. 
Different polities exist in their unique distinctness, by definition, between and among 
plural others. They are not simply multiple, ‘endlessly reproducible repetitions’ of 
themselves (Arendt, 1958: 8, 52). The intrinsic value of a plurality of territorially defined 
entities clarifies Arendt’s rejection of supranational solutions to the ever-present danger 
of totalitarianism, the possibility of atomic war, and the existence of stateless and right-
less persons (1972: 230-231). There was - and should be - ‘an undetermined infinity of 
forms of human living-together’ within a worldwide federated structure (1966 [1951]: 
443; 1968h: 93). Indeed, there were epistemological as well as political and ethical 
grounds for valuing international plurality and why wars of annihilation, defined by their 
destruction of plurality, were impermissible. Historical representation itself had to be 
answerable to the human condition of the plurality of peoples. The historical counterpart 
to Arendt’s ontological basis for political action is that ‘there is nothing in… the 
historical-political world that has assumed full reality… until… all its sides’ have been 
‘revealed’ (2005: 175). Plurality and reality are inextricably linked; the latter requires the 
former, is ‘guaranteed for each by the presence of all’ (1958: 244). Despite its particular 
and partial origins in Arendt’s own lived experiences, such an historical epistemology is 
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eminently compatible with emerging postcolonial forms of writing international history 
and theory: skeptical of grand-sweeping generalizations about global processes and 
developments; wary of easy anachronisms; and more attentive to the lived experiences of 
a plurality of historical persons and peoples. International history is necessarily 
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